Chinese steel subsidies PDF Print E-mail
Written by Stumo   
Tuesday, 30 October 2007

How to you ferret out subsidies in China when the biggest companies are government owned?  Where does the government stop and the company begin?

The Chinese steel industry is in major growth mode.  That would be fine if it were because of that mythical beast, "comparative advantage."  But that mythical beast exists only in children's books, like the troll under the bridge in "Billy Goats Gruff."  Their steel industry grows from massive subsidies.

The European steel industry is looking for 25% to 40% duties on cold-rolled and galvanized steel to neutralize China's actions.

The free traders will shout something about "protectionism" and "trade war".  But what does the dispute have to do with free trade except to seek it?  And how is it a way when you merely neutralize the unfair conduct of the other, but not punish it?

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